Mass Mobilization and the Success of India's Maoists*

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> *[O]ne section [of society] calls for strong action against the Naxalites, even calling them terrorists and urging the use of armed forces against them. Maoists, at the most, are misguided ideologues who have lost faith in the system and feel that the only way to deliver is through the barrel of a gun."*
>
> *~ Digvijay Singh, AICC General Secretary, April 2010*.

India's Maoists (or '"Naxalites'") have at times been a lightly regarded military force, known more for their extreme ideology and political theater than for their military prowess.[1] In his classic study of Naxalite ideology, for example, Rabindra Ray declared the movement a "failure" and referred to the Naxalites as "little beyond an insignificant irritant to those whose authority they question" (Ray 1988). The recent consolidation and expansion of the Maoist insurgency has clearly rendered this type of characterization obsolete.

In the last two years, the Maoists have executed daring attacks, jolting policymakers out of complacency. In 2008, the Maoists established and maintained control over Lalgarh district, just 155 miles from Calcutta, for eight months before the government finally expelled the rebels. Throughout the course of 2009, the Maoists engaged in a series of brazen assaults, including the beheading of an inspector, the hijacking of a passenger train,

[1] The term "Naxalite" relates from the small town in West Bengal called Naxalbari, where the Maoist insurgency began in 1967. We use the terms interchangeably.

the kidnapping of numerous government officials, and attacks on police bases across parts of six states now dubbed the "Red Corridor." In 2010, attacks have continued to increase in size and sophistication. In February the rebels mounted an attack on a military camp that resulted in the death of 24 government troops. On April 6 the rebels lured a battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) into an ambush that resulted in the deaths of 76 officers. An apparent Maoist train derailment resulted in the deaths of 145 passengers on May 28th. The conflict has claimed more than 6,000 lives over the last two decades, and has produced more than 800 casualties in the first six months of this year alone. The rebels have mobilized approximately 25,000 fighters and infiltrated two thirds of India's 626 districts.

Considering the extent of the challenge the insurgency presents to the legitimacy and reach of the Indian state, one might expect the Indian administration, the ruling party and the general public to be unified in their characterization of Maoists as "outlaws" or "terrorists." On one hand, the security establishment has largely viewed the insurgency as a law and order problem. According to this view, Maoists are viewed more as educated criminals with an extreme ideology than as principled insurgents. At best, security experts argue, the Maoists thrive as a result of weak law enforcement--a perception furthered by the fact that police stations and patrols were so frequently the target of Maoist attacks. At worst, Maoists are quasi-state organizations that fundamentally challenge the authority of the central government. Not only have Maoists demonstrated an increasing capacity to seize and control territory, but have also demanded support from local residents and extorted money from industry in exchange for "protection" (Shah 2006). Rebels interfere

with the state's judicial capacity by setting up "people's courts" to try corrupt politicians and to justify killings of police informants.[2] There are also reports that Maoists influence the outcomes of elections by delivering the votes of entire villages (Mukherjee 2010).

When viewed from this perspective, the proper response Maoist threat would focus either on aiding local law enforcement through training of state police and joint patrols with the CRPF, or through direct military intervention. Over time, those calling for a tougher line against the Maoists have grown more vocal and more influential. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has notably characterized the Maoists as "India's number one internal security threat." And the Government of India has launched "Operation Green Hunt," a military campaign designed to root out the Maoist rebels. As part of this operation, Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced that the government would increase support to states most affected by the Maoist uprising. This support included 20,000 additional members of the CRPF to the states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh to join the 35,000 officers already fighting there.

At the same time, the public and the political elites have not offered their unqualified support this hard-line stance. Rather, there has been a great deal of discussion and handwringing over whether Operation Green Hunt is the appropriate response to the insurgency, and whether it will alleviate or exacerbate the conflict over the long term. Amidst despair and debate in the media, Digvijay Singh, the All India Congress Committee General Secretary, and former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, lashed out at the "intellectual arrogance" of Minister Chidambaram for treating the Maoist issue "purely as a

[2] "Maoists split over 'killer' Kishanji," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, October 29, 2009.

law and order problem without taking into consideration the issues that affect the tribals." He emphasized that the Maoists might be "misguided ideologues," but they are not terrorists. According to this argument, the insurgency should be countered by paying greater attention to "issues of livelihood and governance rather than converting the serene and calm environment of Bastar into a battlefield."[3]

This perspective, shared by a number of policymakers and commentators in India, raises an interesting puzzle: what explains variation in how policymakers in a democracy view the nature of the insurgency they confront? Why, in some cases do policymakers overwhelmingly advocate the use of force against insurgents whereas in other conflicts policymakers are more open to debating the social and political roots of conflict? Why, thus far, has the current Maoist uprising in India been relatively successful in convincing voters and policymakers of the justness of its cause?

We argue that insurgent groups are more successful in mobilizing broader public support for their cause when their core strategy centers on mobilizing the poor around shared economic grievances. Insurgent mobilization of the poor has generated intended and unintended consequences. Its intended consequence has been to increase third-party awareness of the plight of the poor, making it difficult to "sell" the use of force to a conflict-averse public. The unintended consequence of mobilization has been to generate new backing for mainstream political parties who seek to represent the interests of a newly mobilized constituency.

[3] citation

Conversely, we argue that it becomes easier for policymakers to coalesce around the use of force when insurgents focus only on mobilizing an elite group of society, or when insurgent strategies are aimed primarily at rent-seeking activities or the capture and exploitation of natural resources. Such activities generate less support from the public and provide few incentives for compromise on the part of political elites. Insurgent groups that are primarily engaged in rent-seeking activities or privilege elite ideological concerns over those of potential movement members.

To develop our argument, we compare two waves of rural insurgency in India. The first wave, lasting from 1967-1972, started with Naxalbari in West Bengal and the second wave, from approximately 2004 till the present, began with the unification of various left of CPI(M) factions and the formation of CPI (Maoist). We argue that the first wave was primarily an insular, elite-centered endeavor that was easily crushed because of its lack of ideological coherence and connection to the poor. We then trace the many splits in the movement that occurred over three decades before its re-emergence in the mid-2000s.

We suggest that, despite its militant intentions, the new movement is more difficult for the government to repress because of its grass-roots orientation and focus on social justice. We show how the movement has successfully promoted a *participatory development frame*, which emphasizes pro-poor policies, pro-tribal legislation and political participation through panchayati (local government) institutions to compete with the *security frame* characterized by the Home Ministry's "Operation Green Hunt" rhetoric. To demonstrate the grass-roots orientation of the movement, we analyze data from 572 Indian districts. The analysis demonstrates that, contrary to many accounts, current Maoist

activity is driven more by economic grievances than rent-seeking activities related to the presence of natural resources.

Phase I: Elite–Centered Mobilization, Fragmentation and State Repression

Following the May 1967 Naxalbari uprising, an editorial in the Communist Party of China's (CPC) *People's Daily* enthusiastically applauded insurgents, colorfully describing the Naxalbari movement as a "peal of spring thunder" that "crashed over the land of India."[4] The CPC was right in some sense--though this armed insurrection of peasants in a hamlet of West Bengal was swiftly crushed, it had formally heralded the birth of the Maoist trend in India. Yet the Maoist perspective in India has a long history. In 1948 Andhra communists leading a peasant partisan struggle in the Telengana districts of the erstwhile Hyderabad State invoked Mao Zedong's "New Democracy" to challenge the all-India leadership of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and its famous 1948 Calcutta thesis. Moreover, the first recorded debate in the world communist movement on the legitimacy of Mao's contribution to Marxist-Leninist thinking took place between the CPI General Secretary, B T Ranadive and the peasant communist leaders of the Andhra region (Ram 1972).

But Mao's thinking was ultimately less influential in India than in China, and was also the source enervating factional struggles within the CPI and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or "CPI(M)" that wreaked havoc on left politics for two decades. A diagrammatic representation of the splits in the left discussed in this section is provided in Figure 1. The internecine feuds took cues from both domestic and international events. At the domestic level, the withdrawal of the Telangana struggle following the march of the

[4] July 5, 1967.

Indian army into Nizam's Hyderabad led to a powerful split within CPI. A faction within CPI resented the 'opportunism' of CPI leaders such as Ajay Ghosh, Rajeshawara Rao, Basavapunniah and Dange. These critics alleged that leaders of the CPI had settled for parliamentary politics, thereby abandoning revolutionary struggle and squandering the gains of peasant mobilization in Nalgonda, Warrangal and Khammam districts of Telangana (Ghosh 2009, 73).

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These differences within the CPI were further aggravated by a series of international events, particularly in the Soviet Union and in China. The People's Republic of China was created in 1949 and many within the communist China's rise might lead to fruitful ties between communist parties in the two countries. Yet the 1951 Party Program of the CPI, much to the chagrin of the pro Mao anti-Dange faction, referred only to the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin and ignored those of Mao. The inner-party struggle reached new heights when the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in 1956 propounded the 'peaceful coexistence' of Communist and Capitalist systems. More significantly, it repudiated the need of revolutionary war against class enemies and proclaimed that transition to socialism would be possible through parliamentary means (Dux 1963; Swearer 1962). While this new Soviet thesis was praised by CPI leaders at the Palghat Congress 1956, left factions within the CPI took the 'Peiking line' and rejected Khruschev's thesis as a revisionist opportunist capitulation. There were severe disagreements when the CPI, under the spell of the Khruschev-Nehru entente, proclaimed that in fighting against the principal enemies of imperialism and feudalism, the

Indian ruling class (or "national bourgeoisie") was fighting on the side of the Indian people rather than against them (Ghosh 2009, 89-95).

Subsequently, the Sino-Indian war in 1962 widened the inner party struggle. The anti-Dange faction within the party interpreted the war as an aggression by the capitalist Indian state against socialist China. This splinter group, calling itself CPI(Marxist), soon became the dominant faction within the party and ultimately in Indian left politics. At the time however, there was an extremist trend within the CPI(M), which wanted to give up the "revisionist" parliamentary path altogether and advocated armed insurrection as advocated by Mao Zedong's. This group took exception to the November 1964 Party Program of CPI(M) that emphasized the possibility of establishing a socialist state through peaceful means while keeping its revolutionary forces vigilant.

In a feeble attempt to bridge the growing ideological divide between warring factions, the CPI(M) conceded that the bourgeoisie in India has "dual character" that both collaborates and contends with imperialism during the 1968 Bardhaman Plenum. By not explicitly stating which of these two characteristics was dominant the CPI(M) hoped to accommodate the ultra-left faction within the party; but this ideological maneuver was in vain. The powerful Andhra Pradesh unit of the CPI(M) revolted against what it perceived as an equivocation and its all-India leadership rejected the Central Committee's draft document (the Madurai draft) on ideological grounds. In addition, the pro-Mao faction in CPI(M) would not agree that the first part of the Indian revolution was completed in 1947 when India became independent. The CPI and then CPI(M), in turn, proclaimed that "Kerala showed the way" through its example of successful left coalition politics. But the ultra-left

faction within the CPM continued to argue that in a "semi-colonial and semi-feudal" country like India, parliamentary revisionism could only erode the left and lead to accommodationist politics.

It was out of these ideological disagreements among political elites, as opposed grass-roots mobilization, that the Naxalite movement in India emerged. The Naxalbari peasant revolt marked the beginning of a revolutionary agrarian movement that was expected to surround, overwhelm and overpower the urban citadels of power for bringing about a revolutionary socialist transformation. With the rift within CPI(M) becoming sharper, and news of Naxalbari spreading to other parts of India (duly aided by Peiking radio) the Naxals came together under an umbrella body called the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in 1968. Subsequently, a majority of Naxals formed the underground CPI(Marxist-Leninist) party (henceforth CPI(ML)) under the leadership of the radical leader Charu Mazumder with support of members from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.

A smaller group of Naxals decided not to join the CPI(ML) citing disagreements over the timing of party formation. These included the Dakshin Desh group and the Andhra Pradesh Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (APCCCR). These groups devised and pursued their own revolutionary strategies. Those of the Dakshin Desh group were ultimately more successful than those of the CPI(ML) and are discussed in greater detail below.

For its part, the CPI(ML) advocated the boycott of elections, insurrection by armed squads, and the annihilation of class enemies (individual terrorism) by combat groups; but crucially it *rejected mass mobilization and mass organizations as revolutionary strategies.* It was a top-heavy elite-centered mobilization that was easy to characterize as a fringe organization. Consequently, when the government launched Operation Crossbow in the 1970s, it framed the Naxal movement as purely a law and order problem. Although the movement spread like a "prairie fire" in India it was very easily put down (Banerjee 1984, 215-263). [need to expand; need citations on Mazumder's mobilization strategy and the government's framing of the movement].

Following decisive defeat in 1972, the movement struggled to find direction and broke into several dozen bickering factions amidst widespread desertions. It was through these divisions however that a much more embedded, grassroots organization emerged. In the next section we discuss the reconsolidation of the movement and the emergence of the second wave of Maoist violence.

Phase II: Mass Mobilization and Political Accommodation

Following their defeat in 1972, groups within the Marxist-Leninist (ML) movement continued to coalesce around an ideological vision that portrayed the Indian state as "semi-colonial and semi-feudal," but became divided on the interpretations of Naxalbari legacy and Charu Mazumder's tactical line (see Figure 1). These divisions where characterized by three broad strategic visions. One faction, represented primarily by CPI(ML) 2nd Central Committee group, wanted to follow Charu Mazumder's strategy without any deviation and continued to practice violent politics while shunning both the ballot box and mass

mobilization (citation). A second faction, by contrast, believed that Majumdar's so-called annihilation politics were so deeply flawed that it shunned the politics of the gun and returned to not only mass mobilization but electoral politics and legal struggle. Prominent groups in this faction included the CPI(ML) Liberation, the CPI(ML) Provisional Central Committee or "CPI(ML)PCC)," the CPI(ML) Kanu Sanyal and the CPI(ML) New Democracy (citation). Not surprisingly, these strategies have not met with very much success. For obvious reasons, simply following Mazumder's old tactics produced few results, and groups that tried to re-enter mainstream politics were at a severe disadvantage relative to more established left parties.

A third vision, which yielded the current Maoist movement, modified Mazumder's line by retaining the politics of gun and boycott of elections, but at the same time creating mass frontal organizations. While violence is central to their strategy, these groups envision a protracted "peoples' war" that depends on mobilizing and training a disciplined "peoples' army" to fight alongside elite militia squads. The CPI(ML) Peoples' War Group, long-dreaded in Andhra Pradesh, and the CPI(ML) Party Unity, equally feared in Bihar, were the proponents of this trend among groups emerging directly out of the original Naxal movement (Banerjee 1984; Basu 2000; Chakravarti 2008; Ramana 2008).

In addition, some groups that had never followed Mazumder emerged to successfully mobilize *dalits* in the eastern states. These included the dreaded "Maoist Communist Centre"(MCC), active in Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal, which descended from the Dakshin Desh group. While the MCC was never part of the Marxist-Leninist tradition that unequivocally acknowledges the Naxalbari legacy, they have always

emphasized the importance of mass organizations. They are infamous for their mobilization of low-caste Biharis in caste wars and their brutal elimination of rival left activists, particularly those from CPI(ML) Party Unity, when they tried to operate in their sphere of influence (citation).

In 1998 a process of reconsolidation began among insurgent groups. A diagram depicting this process is displayed in Figure 2. The process began with the consolidation of the CPI(ML) Peoples' War Group and the CPI(ML) Party Unity to form the CPI(ML) PW, thus providing a unified command structure for insurgents operating in six states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra).[5] And in 2004, the CPI(ML) PW merged with the MCC to form the CPI(Maoist).[6] With this consolidation, the insurgents achieved a unified command structure over insurgents operating in nine states. By 2006, CPI(Maoist) earned the dubious distinction of being the greatest internal security challenge ever faced by the country.[7] And by 2009, the Maoists have some presence in 223 districts across 14 states, and have virtual control of 70 districts mostly spread across the tribal hinterland of India (Ramakrishnan 2009).[8]

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The success of the CPI(Maoist) in controlling large swaths of territory derives, in part, from its ability to mobilize *dalits* and *adivasis* around common economic and social

[5] citation
[6] citation
[7] Manmohan Singh, "Focus on Good Governance, Reducing Deprivation and Alienation" during the Concluding Remarks at the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers on Naxalism, April 13, 2006, available at http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128, retrieved on November 21, 2009.

[8] Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh; Taking on the Maoists; Frontline Vol 26, Issue 22, Oct24-Nov 06, 2009

grievances that are rooted in India's caste system. Early waves of Maoist violence resulted from the failure of land reform and the economic marginalization of *dalits,* who fall outside of the traditional four-fold *varna* system (literally "outcastes") and traditionally work as landless laborers (Banerjee 1984; Dasgupta 1974).[9] And as we demonstrate in greater detail below, more recent waves of violence relate to the economic and social marginalization of *adivasis* (tribals) who like *dalits* fall outside of the caste system but live primarily in forested areas of the country.

There has been no shortage of attempts to repress the Maoists. In addition to operation Green Hunt, officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs have requested that the government deploy colonels to assist with operations in heavily affected states. Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has requested permission from the United Nations (UN) to recall several helicopter gunships from missions in Africa so that they can be used to battle insurgents in the Red Corridor.[10] There has also been some discussion of redeploying special operations forces, such as the Rashtriya Rifles (based in Kashmir) to battle Maoists in the most affected areas.[11] Although not an official policy of the central government, a related and more long-standing response at the state level has been to secretly arm and fund paramilitary groups like the Salwa Judum or "the purification hunt," which has dramatically escalated the conflict by most accounts (Miklian 2009; Shah and Pettigrew 2009).

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[9] In addition to 'outcastes,' *dalits* are also commonly referred to as *harijans* or "scheduled castes" because of the government lists that designate them as a disadvantaged group.
[10] "Maoist effect on U.N. mission—IAF seeks nod to recall choppers, army mulls deputing colonels to states," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, June 21, 2010.
[11] "On war footing: coming up, a new battle plan, a new brigade HQ," *Outlook India*, October 13, 2009.

However, the broad mobilization of *dalits* and *advisis* around shared grievances has made it very difficult for the government to frame the conflict purely in terms of security concerns. Critics of the government have argued that a hard-line approach to the insurgency is unlikely to work because it fails to deal with these underlying grievances. The novelist and social activist Arundhati Roy recently published an extended and characteristically lyrical essay praising the Maoists as heroic defenders of *adivasi* rights and culture, and portraying the army as the private militia of corporate mining interests.[12] While Roy's blind support for the Maoists has been criticized in mainstream Indian media, the underlying sentiment that *dalits* and *adivasis* are victims of corporate greed and a political system that ignores their voice is widespread. It is an argument that appeals not only to the population in Maoist-affected areas (Gupta 2007), but one that also has the potential to mobilize the many Indians living outside of these areas who fail to benefit from economic reforms and the expansion of the industrial economy (Banerjee 2005; Banerjee 2009).

Economic Grievances and Maoist Violence

In the previous section, we saw that the contemporary wave of Maoist violence has been associated with a more broad-based mobilization around the grievances of *dalits* and *adivasis* than the first wave in the 1970s. Yet the nature of these grievances has been somewhat unclear. We know from previous studies that groups, such as the MCC, operating in the East have mobilized *dalits* in response that land inequality has historically been a major source of conflict in rural India (Urdal 2008).

[12] Arundhati Roy. "Walking with the comrades," *Outlook India*, March 29, 2010.

Land has also been cited as a major issue in the contemporary struggles of *dalits* but with a slightly different twist. Specifically, India's rapid economic growth has given rise to large-scale development projects, including dam projects that flood tribal areas, mining projects that dispossess poor inhabitants, and the development of green sites for industry. The initiation of these projects has resulted in state-sponsored land grabs that have often been disruptive for *adivasis*, who depend on the forest to sustain their culture and way of life (Ahuja and Ganguly 2007).

Some have go so far as to argue that Maoist uprising is primarily the result of the increased pace of industrialization in India's post-reform era. For example, in a recent article in Foregin Policy magazine, Miklian and Carney (2010) state: "If you were to lay a map of today's Maoist insurgency over a map of the mining activity powering India's boom, the two would line up almost perfectly." A major problem is that "this geological inheritence has been managed so disastrously that many locals—uprooted, unemployed, and living in a toxic and dangerous environment, due to the mining operations—have thrown in their lot with the Maoists. But then the authors go on to say that the "mines are also cash registers for the Maoist war chest. Through extortion, covert attacks, and plain old theft, insurgents have tapped a steady stream of mining money to pay their foot soldiers and buy arms and ammunition, sometimes from treasonous cops themselves."

This is a very common, if somewhat inconsistent, formulation: the Maoists are tapping into *adivasi* frustration with strip-mining in the forest and seek to defend them from land-grabs by greedy corporations; yet the Maoist are rent seekers who depend on mining as a source of revenue. If true this argument would pose problems for our

characterization of the Maoists as a broad-based organization. First mining operations directly affect only a small minority of districts in India. For example, in 2001 there were 276 bauxite mines in India but they were concentrated in just 25 districts with one district (Lawngtlai, Mizoram) being home to 100 of them. Another 66 were located in Jamnagar, Gujarat. Neither of these places are hotbeds of Maoist activity. Ninety-five percent of districts did not have a bauxite mine at all. Similarly, only 7 percent of districts had a coalmine in 2001 and just four percent of districts had an iron-ore mine. A second problem this argument could pose for our paper is that it suggests that Maoists are purely opportunists or rent-seekers. The notion that mining is causing the conflict is driven by industrialization and mining interests in particular would therefore cut against our claim that the Maoists are a broad-based organization.

Data and Method

To test our argument against this plausible alternative explanation, we gathered data on conflict, poverty and mining operations from 595 Indian districts. The data on conflict come from the National Counterterrorism Center's World Incident Tracking System. The WITS data are based on local, national and international press reports, and they are available for the period 2004-2009. During this period the WITS dataset lists 5,160 conflict events for India, of which 1,501 we can confidently classify as attacks carried out by Maoist-related groups. The WITS dataset records 1,943 deaths associated with these 1,501 incidents. The WITS data are geocoded, which made it possible to import them into ArcGIS and collapse the data by district. The resulting district-level sums of Maoist incidents and

related deaths are the dependent variables in our analysis. A map of Maoist incidents based on this dataset is provided in Figure 2.3.

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To analyze the relationship between conflict and economic grievances, we gathered district-level census data on the percentage of households reporting no assets, the literacy rate and the percentage of *dalit* and *adivasi* households reporting access to a latrine. The data on assets and latrines serve as a broad measure of poverty while the data on literacy rates serve as a proxy for access to educational services, and arguably social services more generally.

To analyze the relationship between conflict and mineral extraction, we gathered data from 2001 on the tonnage of iron-ore per square kilometer, the tonnage of bauxite mined per square kilometer and the value of coal mined per square kilometer for each district. These minerals were selected for analysis because they are generally thought to be those most closely related to industrialization and therefore the Maoist uprising.

In the regressions, we controlled for population to account for the increased difficulty in policing a large population. We included population density as a proxy for urbanization. And we included the percentage of a district covered by forest to account for the fact that insurgent groups tend to operate more freely in forested areas and mountainous regions (Fearon and Laitin 2004). While we could not locate data on terrain, one generally finds a very close correlation between forest cover and mountainous terrain in India.

Results

The results of this analysis provide strong support for the argument that Maoists are mobilizing broad-based economic grievances. Table 1 displays the results of the relevant models. Models 1-3 analyze the relationship between economic grievances and the number of Maoist incidents. Models 4-6 look at the relationship between grievances and the number of deaths related to these incidents. The percentage of households without assets is positively associated with conflict outcomes whereas increased literacy and SC/ST access to latrines is negatively associated with conflict outcomes. According to the results, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the population reporting no assets increases the likelihood of a Maoist attack by a factor of 2.83 and the likelihood of a casualty in a Maoist attack by a factor of about 3.25. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in literacy is associated with a 70% reduction in the likelihood of a Maoist incident or death, and a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the SC/ST population with access to a latrine is associated with an 82% reduction in the likelihood of a Maoist incident (88% for an event).

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Population and forest cover are also associated with more Maoist activity. Based on results of models one and four, a one standard deviation change in population increases the likelihood of a Maoist attack by a factor of 5.5 and the likelihood of a casualty by a factor of 6.7. A one standard deviation change in forest cover increases the likelihood of a Maoist attack by a factor 2.8 and the likelihood of a casualty by a factor of 3.9. Thus while the

substantive effect of population is much larger than any other variable, the effect of forest cover is about the same as an economic grievance.

The relationship between conflict and extractive industries is analyzed in Table 2. None of the mining variables is statistically significant. Analysis of a number of other minerals as well as drilling for natural gas and oil (not displayed in this paper) yield the same result. Considering the physical distribution of mines in relation to the widespread nature of the conflict, this should not be surprising. Mining activity is simply not widespread enough to explain the geographic reach of the Maoist insurgency.

This is not to suggest that many adivasis and dalits have not suffered from rapid industrial development in recent years, or to minimize the frustration and loss these groups have suffered. It is only to say that mining cannot be the primary or even a major cause of the conflict. Mining is a highly visible activity conducted by corporations that become easy targets for movement leaders. But despite of their rhetorical value to the movement or even the occasional shakedown, the mining activity could not have served as the primary target or organizing principle of the Moaist movement.

Conclusion

This paper has offered some thoughts on the recent success of the Maoist movement. We compared to waves of Maoist insurgency. The first wave (1967-1972) started with Naxalbari in West Bengal and the second wave (2004 till present) began with the unification of various left of CPI(M) factions and the formation of CPI (Maoist). We argued that the Naxalbari uprising and its immediate aftermath was an elite-driven top-heavy movement that mobilized urban intelligentsia into action squads and believed more

in individual annihilation of class enemies than in organized mass action. The current phase of the movement, in contrast, is more rural than urban, has a substantial geographical spread over India's tribal heartland, has a pronounced mass character, and mobilizes tribal guerrilla armies rather than small action squads.

We argued that the elite centered nature of the first movement made it easy for the government frame the Naxalite issue purely in security terms. Operation Crossbow unleashed state civil and paramilitary forces, eliminated their top leadership and crushed the movement. In the current phase, however, there is an ongoing debate in Indian policy circles between proponents of Operation Green Hunt, who speak of the movement primarily in terms of a security frame and those who view it as more of a development issue. We argued that this is very likely the consequence of the Maoist focus on issues of justice pertaining to marginalized *dalits* and *adivasis*.

We drew on data from 595 Indian districts to demonstrate Maoist activity maps closely onto the presence of economic grievances but not mining activity. We argued that while the Maoists may use mining issues and corporations as targets for their rhetorical attacks, mining is not a core motivation for the movement. These findings suggest that the movement represents a broader constituency than just those rural inhabitants impacted by rural-urban struggles regarding the pace and contours of industrial development. The findings also suggest that Maoists are not fighting the insurgency purely or even primarily for the purposes of extracting rents from industry.

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

Figure 1: Splits in the Left Movement



Figure 2: Reconsolidation of Maoist Groups



Figure 3: The "Red Corridor" as Depicted by Events Recorded in WITS

Table 1: Poverty and Maoist Attacks in the Indian Districts

VARIABLES	(1) Maoist Events	(2) Maoist Events	(3) Maoist Events	(4) Number of Deaths	(5) Number of Deaths	(6) Number of Deaths
% Households reporting no assets	6.492***			7.380***		
	(1.261)			(1.470)		
Literacy Rate		-0.097***			-0.092***	
		(0.016)			(0.016)	
% SC/ST households with access to latrine			-9.997***			-12.354***
			(1.165)			(1.406)
Log of population	1.766***	1.709***	1.858***	1.937***	1.955***	2.092***
	(0.294)	(0.288)	(0.262)	(0.350)	(0.348)	(0.303)
Log of population density	-0.255	-0.121	-0.046	-0.249	-0.077	-0.509*
	(0.304)	(0.268)	(0.256)	(0.396)	(0.346)	(0.301)
Forest Cover	0.042***	0.054***	0.052***	0.056***	0.068***	0.048***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Constant	-26.851***	-18.587***	-25.463***	-29.944***	-22.853***	-25.719***
	(4.392)	(4.255)	(4.050)	(5.310)	(5.172)	(4.635)
Observations	540	565	512	540	565	512
Log Likelihood	-500.3	-548.2	-544.5	-464.9	-518.0	-510.1
χ^2	4006	3487	3680	5647	4807	5542

Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist attacks and deaths related to Maoist attacks. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Minerals and Maoist Attacks in the Indian Districts

VARIABLES	(1) Maoist Events	(2) Maoist Events	(3) Maoist Events	(4) Number of Deaths	(5) Number of Deaths	(6) Number of Deaths
Tonnage of bauxite per sqare km	0.007			0.006		
	(0.007)			(0.008)		
Tonnage of iron-ore per square km		3.539			4.318	
		(3.646)			(4.192)	
Value of coal mined per square km			0.00006			-0.00005
			(0.0003)			(0.0002)
Log population	1.541***	1.395***	1.449***	1.668***	1.563***	1.641***
	(0.278)	(0.274)	(0.273)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.329)
Log population density	-0.296	-0.307	-0.334	-0.321	-0.414	-0.421
	(0.306)	(0.295)	(0.302)	(0.371)	(0.346)	(0.356)
Forrest cover	0.041**	0.032**	0.038**	0.053***	0.038**	0.048**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	-20.491***	-18.183***	-18.865***	-22.309***	-19.989***	-21.183***
	(4.264)	(4.194)	(4.256)	(5.044)	(4.932)	(5.022)
Observations	572	572	572	572	572	572
Log likelihood	-586.8	-587.7	-588.3	-553.1	-553.3	-554.0
χ^2	4929	4828	4993	7230	6840	7305

Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist attacks and deaths related to Maoist attacks. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1