

Persistent Problems in the Global South: Policies and Politics
Spring 2025

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Class Time: Wednesday 11:00am-12:50pm IAB 801
Office Hours: <https://calendly.com/rumelasen/springofficehours>

Course Description

This course examines the politics of persistent policy challenges in the Global South, a term that traditionally refers to developing nations but also encompasses marginalized communities in wealthier countries affected by globalization.

Poverty, inequality, hunger, communicable diseases, water scarcity, political and financial instability, and corruption are among the most persistent challenges in the Global South. While policymakers have invested significant resources to address these issues, their global roots often make them more complex and difficult to resolve. Responses to these problems vary across the Global South, shaped by each country's unique historical and political context. This variation highlights that developing countries are not uniform and provides valuable opportunities for comparative analysis of policies and outcomes.

This course takes a comparative approach, drawing on the histories and experiences of developing countries worldwide. Each week, we will focus on a key challenge in the Global South using an empirically grounded, case-based method, supported by relevant theoretical frameworks and policy literature. While recognizing country-specific differences, we will also examine common constraints—such as colonial legacies, resource scarcity, and institutional barriers—that set these nations apart from wealthier Global North countries.

Course Goals

This course fulfills the core political development requirement of the EPD concentration at SIPA. By the end of the course, I expect students to have a firm grasp on the theoretical and policy debates around some of the most persistent problems in the Global South. Students will be able to critically evaluate various competing theoretical explanations for these problems, while also examining case studies of how countries responded differently to these problems. They will also learn the comparative method, and will apply their understanding of it to write a policy report. In addition, students in this course will become proficient consumers of policy-relevant, cutting edge social science research.

Assignments and Grading

Your final grade is composed of the following parts.

Participation (50%)	
Ongoing Participation	20%
Discussion Memo and Presentation	30%
Policy Analysis (50%)	
• Topic Memo	10%
• Final Policy Presentation	40%

Participation (50%):

Ongoing Class Participation (20%)

Ongoing class participation grades (20%) will be calculated based on attendance and contributions to weekly class discussions. Both the quality and quantity of participation matters.

Discussion Memo and Presentation (30%)

At the start of the semester, each student will sign up to be discussion leader for a week.

As discussion leaders, students signed up for a week will **collaboratively** prepare a **750-word discussion memo** covering the week's readings. The memo must include (a) a brief summary of readings (b) a reflective component where students connect the reading to their personal experiences, policy interests, or current events. Students are also encouraged to include visual elements like concept maps, charts, or infographics to represent the key arguments and relationships in the readings.

Here's a [summary bingo card](#) - each square contains an element or task students must incorporate into their discussion memo. The goal is to encourage critical engagement with the text while making the activity fun and challenging. Incorporate at least four squares from the Bingo card into your summary. For an extra challenge, aim for a Bingo (a full row, column, or diagonal).

Discussion leaders will also be responsible for making a **collaborative presentation** in class (15-20 minutes). This presentation must highlight (a) a concise overview of the

readings and how they relate to the week's theme (b) key insight or what you found most interesting or thought-provoking © Find a case or empirical evidence beyond the assigned readings to illustrate/critique the arguments (d) At least two discussion questions to prompt class discussion. I encourage you to take the presentation seriously as a community building activity that every student in the class has a stake in and can benefit from.

The memo is due 48 hours before class (Monday of the week, 11 am). The slides are due before class (Wednesday, 11 am). You can upload your group discussion memo and PowerPoint slides on Coursework.

You can sign up [here](#)

If you're not the discussion leader for a week, you must still be prepared to participate in class for your ongoing participation grade.

Policy Analysis (50%)

You will write a policy report on a specific policy of your choice. You will first submit a topic memo (10% of your grade) first, and then make a final presentation (40% of your grade). The topic for this policy report must be something more specific than our broad weekly themes. Altogether, the policy Analysis will account for **50%** of your final grade; we will proceed in stages to make the task less daunting and to improve the quality of the final product:

Topic Memo (10%): The Topic Definition Memo (10%) is due on **February 12**. In this memo, you will identify a specific problem or policy challenge in a country of your choice, define the issue, and provide a brief historical background covering the origin and evolution of the problem as well as key policy responses to address it. Your memo must include a bibliography. You may not change your topic after **Week 5** unless feedback on your submission recommends a change. If you change your topic without approval, your grade for this memo will be retroactively lowered. To ensure a strong and cohesive submission, start thinking early about your project focus.

Word Limit: 500 words, 10% of your final grade.

FINAL POLICY PRESENTATION (40%): You will prepare a final presentation building on the previous memo. In addition, you will also submit a final policy memo. More detailed directions will be uploaded on Courseworks.

Important Course Deadlines

The following table sums up the various assignments, their weightage and due dates:

<i>Assignments</i>	<i>S u b m i s s i o n Instruction</i>	<i>% of Grade</i>	<i>Due Date</i>
Participation			
W e e k l y Participation	In Class	20%	-
Discussion Memo and Presentation	via Courseworks and In class	30%	48 hours before class (late penalty will apply)
Policy Analysis			
Topic Memo	via Courseworks	10%	Week 5 (Feb 12)
Policy Presentation	via Courseworks	40%	Week 13 (April)

Course Policies

Late Assignments: Please consult the syllabus for information about the due dates for your assignments. The deadlines for assignments are firm. Extensions will only be granted for illness (with a doctor's note), family emergencies (with a Dean's note), or religious observances (with prior approval from the instructor). Late submissions will incur a penalty of one full letter grade. No exceptions will be made. If you believe you need an extension for any other reason, you must schedule an appointment and present your case at least one week before the deadline.

Grade Appeals: Any student who believes that a grade does not reflect his or her performance can always dispute his or her grade. All grade appeals should be made in writing. A student disputing a grade must write a brief memo explaining why he or she should have received a higher grade on that assignment. This must be done within a week after the grade is announced, and submitted after class or during office hours. I will respond in writing.

Diversity and Inclusion

This course is designed fully cognizant of the differential impact of policy decisions on various socio-economic or racial groups within a country, and will highlight those inequities consistently. In addition, this course is designed mindful of the need to go beyond ethnocentric depiction of developing countries and includes readings, whenever possible, by authors from groups typically underrepresented in academic or policy

literature.

Attendance

The class will meet once a week. Attendance is mandatory, and class participation comprises a significant portion of the grade. Students are expected to do the readings before the class in order to participate in the discussion. But if you cannot come to class for some reason, please let me know *24 hours* in advance.

Office Hours

You can sign up for my office hours [here](#)

Academic Integrity

The School of International & Public Affairs does not tolerate cheating and/or plagiarism in any form. Those students who violate the Code of Academic & Professional Conduct will be subject to the Dean's Disciplinary Procedures.

Please familiarize yourself with the proper methods of citation and attribution. The School provides some useful resources online; we strongly encourage you to familiarize yourself with these various styles before conducting your research. Cut and paste the following link into your browser to view the Code of Academic & Professional Conduct and to access useful resources on citation and attribution [here](#).

Students with Disabilities: SIPA is committed to ensuring that students registered with Columbia University's [Disability Services](#) (DS) receive the reasonable accommodations necessary for their full participation in their academic programs. If you are a student with a disability and have a DS-certified accommodation letter, you may wish to make an appointment with the course instructor to discuss your accommodations. Faculty provides disability accommodations to students with DS-certified accommodation letters, and they provide the accommodations specified in such letters. If you have any additional questions, please contact SIPA's DS liaison at disability@sipa.columbia.edu and/or 212-854-8690.

Course Material

This course does not require you to purchase any textbook. All readings will be uploaded on Courseworks.

<p>Week 1</p> <p>January 22</p>	<p>Introduction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syllabus • What is the Global South • Why Are We Not on Track to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals?
PART 1:ROLE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS	
<p>Week 2</p> <p>January 29</p>	<p>Formal and Informal Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do institutions affect political and economic outcomes? • Colonial Legacies • Informal Institutions <p>Case: Role of Informal Institutions in Policy Reform</p>
<p>Week 3</p> <p>February 5</p>	<p>Democracy and Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy and Social Outcomes • Democracies with adjectives? • Democratic Authoritarianism <p>Case Study: Role of Democracy in preventing famines.</p>
PART 2: POVERTY AND HUNGER	
<p>Week 4</p> <p>February 12</p>	<p>Poverty</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy and Social Policy • Poverty and Access to Healthcare <p>Case Study: The gendered poverty effects of the COVID-19</p>
<p>Week 5</p> <p>February 19</p>	<p>Food Insecurity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Hunger Index and Zero Hunger Target • The Precarious Balance of Food Security and Poverty • Politics v Policies of Food Security <p>Case Study: The Distribution of Hunger</p>
PART 3: PERILS OF INEQUALITY	

<p>Week 6</p> <p>February 26</p>	<p>Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How Developing Countries Manage Ethnic Diversity • The Dilemmas of Diversity • Federalism for Conflict Mitigation • Ethnic Diversity and Comparative Public Policy • Representative Bureaucracy <p>Case Study: Lessons from ethnic violence in India and Sri Lanka</p>
<p>Week 7</p> <p>March 5</p>	<p>State, Market and Inequality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship between State and Market • Adam Smith and Marx • Keynes and Hayek • Capability Approach • Why is Redistribution Contentious? <p>Case Study: The Affirmative Action Debate in India</p>
<p>Week 8</p> <p>March 12</p>	<p>Race, Class and Gender</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horizontal Inequality • Women's Representation in Decision-making and Leadership • Mainstreaming Gender in Public Policies • Effect of Women's Health on Development • Impact of Race, Class and Ethnicity on Gender Exclusion <p>Case Study: Gender Representation in Zambia and in China</p>
<p>Spring Recess March 17-21</p>	
<p>Week 9</p> <p>March 26</p>	<p>Populism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Left and Right-wing Populism • Economic Populism • Cultural Nationalism • Parties, Partisanship and Grassroots Mobilization <p>Case Study: Left-Wing Populism in Latin America</p>
<p>PART 4: PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND REGIME ACCOUNTABILITY</p>	

Week 10 April 2	Government Accountability Elections holding regimes accountable Accountability in non-democratic regimes Political selection Case Study: Government Accountability in China
Week 11 April 9	Corruption <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measuring Corruption • What Does Good Governance look like? • Petty Corruption • Bureaucratic Red Tape Case Study: Corruption in India and West Africa
Week 12 April 16	Social Unrest <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Economics of Social Unrest • Can We Blame the Youth Bulge for Social Unrest? • Electoral Violence Case Study: Arab Spring and Hong Kong Protests
Week 13-14 April 23, 30	Final Presentations

Course Outline

Week 1: Introduction

This week's readings explore the promises and pitfalls of global development agendas. Hobbes (2014) critiques the "save-the-world" mindset for its simplistic solutions and unintended harms. Sachs (2012) champions the SDGs as a necessary evolution toward holistic and sustainable progress, while Easterly (2015) dismisses them as vague, impractical, and symbolic. Together, these perspectives challenge us to consider whether the SDGs represent meaningful progress or merely aspirational rhetoric. From a Global South perspective, do the SDGs offer a meaningful departure from the MDGs in addressing structural inequalities and historical injustices, or do they perpetuate a development agenda shaped by the economic and ecological priorities of wealthier nations, thereby constraining the policy autonomy of developing countries?

Hobbes, M. (2014). [Stop trying to save the world](#). *The New Republic*, 17.

Sachs, J. D. (2012). From millennium development goals to sustainable development

goals. *The Lancet*, 379(9832), 2206-2211.

Easterly, W. (2015). The SDGs should stand for senseless, dreamy, garbled. *Foreign Policy*, 28.

Students can familiarize themselves with the broad outlines of World Development Reports 2012-2020 [here](#)

Week 2: Formal and Informal Institutions

Why are some countries much poorer than others? Economists and political scientists have pointed to institutional differences as the key determinant of economic development. What are institutions? Why do we need institutions? Are institutions really the key determinants of economic outcomes? To what extent do institutions drive economic and social outcomes, and how can we account for the influence of historical legacies and geographic factors without overstating or underplaying their significance in development? In many developing countries informal institutions compensate for the weakness of formal institutions. What are informal institutions? Can we make the case that a development-orientated institutional perspective needs to emphasize more explicitly the role of informal institutions?

North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 5(1), 97-112.

Easterly, W. (2001). Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 49(4), 687-706. doi:10.1086/452521

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. *Handbook of economic growth*, 1, 385-472.

McArthur, J. W., & Sachs, J. D. (2001). *Institutions and geography: comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)* (No. w8114). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India. *American economic review*, 95(4), 1190-1213.

Case Study: Informal Institutions and Right to Work in India

Marcresse, T. (2018). Public policy reform and informal institutions: The political articulation of the demand for work in rural India. *World development*, 103, 284-296.

Week 3: Democracy and Development

This week's readings explore the complex relationship between democracy, authoritarianism, and development. Ross (2006) questions whether democracy improves outcomes for the poor, while Geddes (1999) reviews key insights and gaps in democratization research. Collier and Levitsky (1997) critique the proliferation of "adjectival democracies" in comparative studies. Brancati (2014) explores hybrid regimes blending democratic and authoritarian elements, and Bunce and Wolchik (2010) analyze electoral strategies that challenge authoritarian rule. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) assess whether democracies pursue different public policies than non-democracies. Collectively, the readings challenge assumptions about regime types and their impact on governance and development. How do variations in democratic and authoritarian practices influence the policymaking process, and what do these variations reveal about the relationship between political institutions and the pursuit of meaningful political and economic reform?

Ross, M. (2006). Is democracy good for the poor?. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 860-874

Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years?. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1), 115-144.

Collier, D., & Levitsky, S. (1997). Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research. *World politics*, 49(3), 430-451.

Brancati, D. (2014). Democratic authoritarianism: Origins and effects. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17, 313-326.

Mulligan, C. B., Gil, R., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004). Do democracies have different public policies than non democracies?. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1), 51-74.

<i>Case Study: How democracy affects public policy</i>
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Sen, A. (1993). The causation and prevention of famines: a reply.

PART 2: POVERTY and HUNGER

Week 4: Poverty

Today, more than [821 million people regularly go to bed hungry](#), of whom 100-plus million suffer from acute hunger, largely due to man-made conflicts, climate change and economic downturns. This week's readings examine the relationship between poverty, hunger, and social protection in times of crisis. The *World Bank* and Sen (2001) emphasize the importance of inclusive institutions in addressing deprivation, while Banerjee and Duflo (2007) show how poverty limits economic choices, perpetuating food

insecurity. Traub and von Chamier, Dorlach (2023), and Pangestu (2020) highlight how weak welfare systems during COVID-19 exacerbated hunger and poverty, particularly in the Global South. Cuesta and Pico (2020) underscore the pandemic's gendered impacts, with women facing greater food insecurity. A critical question: What kind of welfare policies could more effectively address food insecurity and poverty during global crises?

Poverty Overview. [The World Bank](#).

Sen, A. (2001). Democracy and social justice. *Democracy, Market Economics & Development, an Asian Perspective*. Washington: World Bank, 7-24.

Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2007). The economic lives of the poor. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 21(1), 141-168.

James Traub and Paul von Chamier. [Can Coronavirus Anger Revive Welfare State?](#)

Dorlach, T. (2023). Social policy responses to Covid-19 in the global south: Evidence from 36 countries. *Social Policy and Society*, 22(1), 94-105.

[Welfare policies in the US during Covid 19](#) (For Comparison)

Pangestu, M. "For the poorest countries, the full danger from coronavirus is only just coming into view." *The Telegraph* 7 (2020).

<p><u>Case Study: Poverty and Covid 19</u></p>
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<p>Cuesta, J., & Pico, J. (2020). The gendered poverty effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in Colombia. <i>The European journal of development research</i>, 32(5), 1558.</p>
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Week 5: Food Security

This week's readings explore the structural and political drivers of hunger and poverty in the Global South, engaging with questions of governance, inequality, and global policy responses. Sen (1981) argues that hunger often results not from food scarcity but from failures of institutions. In contrast, de Waal (1997) focuses on the political instrumentalization of famine, highlighting how authoritarian regimes often use food as a weapon of control. While Patel and Moore (2017) critique neoliberal food systems for prioritizing profits over local food security, Moyo (2020) discusses land reform's potential to reduce hunger. Recurring themes include institutional accountability, the global political economy's role in local food systems, and the intersection of hunger with broader inequalities. How can efforts to address hunger balance immediate food security needs with long-term structural changes, and what role should global institutions play in supporting sustainable and locally-driven solutions in the Global South?

[Global Hunger Index](#). Interactive Map.

SDG 2030: [Zero Hunger Target](#)

Sen, A. (2019). The political economy of hunger.

Sen, A. (1991). Public action to remedy hunger. *Interdisciplinary science reviews*, 16(4), 324-336.

Ahmed, A. U et al (2007). *The world's most deprived: Characteristics and causes of extreme poverty and hunger* (Vol. 43). Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

Juma, C. (2011). Preventing hunger: biotechnology is key. *Nature*, 479(7374), 471-472.

Riches, G. (1997). Hunger, food security and welfare policies: issues and debates in First World societies. *PNS*, 56(1A), 63-74.

Kennedy, G., Nantel, G., & Shetty, P. (2004). Globalization of food systems in developing countries: impact on food security and nutrition. Introduction.

Case Study:

Maxwell, Simon, Jeremy Swift, and Margaret Buchanan-Smith. "Is Food Security Targeting Possible in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from North Sudan." *Ids Bulletin* 21, no. 3 (1990): 52-61.

Harriss, B. (1986). The intra family distribution of hunger in South Asia.

PART 3: PERILS OF INEQUALITY

Week 6: Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods

Ethnically differentiated societies are often regarded as dysfunctional, with poor economic performance and a high risk of violent civil conflict. How does ethnic diversity impact other political and economic outcomes in developing countries? What are the various models for managing ethnic diversity? What do we know about institutional designs and policy responses best and worst suited in managing diversity? Can representative bureaucracy better manage diversity?

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?. *American Political Science Review*,

709-725.

Castles, S. (1995). How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 21(3), 293-308.

Collier, P. (2001). Implications of ethnic diversity. *Economic policy*, 16(32), 128-166.

Brancati, D. (2006). Decentralization: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism?. *International Organization*, 651-685.

Meier, K. J., & Nigro, L. G. (1976). Representative bureaucracy and policy preferences: A study in the attitudes of federal executives. *Public Administration Review*, 36(4), 458-469.

Case Study: Lessons from Ethnic Violence

Steven Wilkinson. 2004. "The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence" Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Chapter 1 pp 1-18.

DeVotta, N. (2005). From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict: the institutional bases for Sri Lanka's separatist war 1. *Nations and Nationalism*, 11(1), 141-159.

Week 7: State, Market and Inequality

Equality has long been among the most potent of human ideals and it continues to play a prominent role in political argument. Views about equality inform much of the debate about wide-ranging policy issues. How did Adam Smith, Marx, Keynes and Hayek understand inequality? What are the various types and measures of inequality? In the case studies of the week, we examine how entrenched inequalities affect policy implementation.

Solomon, M. S. (2010). Critical ideas in times of crisis: Reconsidering Smith, Marx, Keynes, and Hayek. *Globalizations*, 7(1-2), 127-135.

Wade, R. H. (2014). The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality. *Real-world economics review*, 69(4), 2-17.

Sen, A. K. (1997). From income inequality to economic inequality. *Southern Economic Journal*, 64(2), 384-401.

Sen, A. (2001). The many faces of gender inequality. *New republic*, 35-39.

[The Return of the Visible Hand: state Capitalism to Authoritarian Capitalism](#)

State-permeated Capitalism in Large Emerging Economies

India's economic growth: Don't just tell me the size of the pie – tell me the measure of my slice

Case Study: The Affirmative Action Debate

Aklin, M., Cheng, C. Y., & Urpelainen, J. (2020). Inequality in Policy Implementation: Caste and Electrification in Rural India.

Week 8: Race, Class and Gender

Current thinking about development places individuals firmly at the center of concern as the basic unit for analysis and policy. The Millennium Development Goals, for example, focus on the numbers of individuals in poverty in the world, with little regard to what the race, gender, and ethnicity of these individuals are, or where they live. However, group membership (e.g. caste, clan, gender, race, religion) makes up the identity (or multiple identities) of individuals, and often determine their life chances, including where they live, who they meet, how they are treated, what schools they attend, and so on. The central conceptual foundation this week is horizontal inequality: how do policy makers deal with and account for horizontal inequality, defined as inequality among groups?

Stewart, F. (2005). Horizontal inequalities: A neglected dimension of development. In *Wider perspectives on global development* (pp. 101-135). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Frances Stewart, [Can Horizontal Inequalities be overcome?](#), UNHDR

Human Development Report 2019, Chapter 7

Sanyal, P. (2009). From credit to collective action: The role of microfinance in promoting women's social capital and normative influence. *American sociological review*, 74(4), 529-550.

Piscopo, J. M. (2015). States as gender equality activists: The evolution of quota laws in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 57(3), 27-49.

Case Study: Gender Representation in Zambia and in China

Bratton, M. (1999). Political participation in a new democracy: institutional considerations from Zambia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 32(5), 549-588.

Jacka, T., & Sargeson, S. (2015). Representing women in Chinese village self-government: a new perspective on gender, representation, and democracy. *Critical Asian Studies*, 47(4), 477-494.

Week 9: Populism

Populism is currently the defining political dynamic of our times, which is bound to affect the design and outcomes of public policy. What is populism? Is populism in Latin America the same as populism in Europe or Asia? How does populist politics impact policymaking on core issues inequality, accountability or representation?

Cas Mudde (2018). [How populism became the concept that defines our age](#).

S Zabala (2017). [The Difference between Right and Left –Wing Populism](#)

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2013). Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: Comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and opposition*, 48(2), 147-174.

Roberts, K. M. (2006). Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, 127-148.

Franko, W. W., & Witko, C. (2018). *The new economic populism: How states respond to economic inequality*. Oxford University Press. [Introduction](#)

Case Study: Left-Wing Populism in Latin America

Sachs, J. D. (1989). *Social conflict and populist policies in Latin America* (No. w2897). National Bureau of Economic Research.

NYT [Opinion | The Return of Populism, Latin America Style](#)

PART 4: PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND REGIME ACCOUNTABILITY

Week 10: Improving Accountability

How do countries build regimes and systems allowing voters to throw the inefficient politicians out, improve political selection and limit corruption among elected officials?

Manzetti, Luigi and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 949-970.

Tim Besley and Robin Burgess. (2002). “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India”, QJE, 117(4).

Robin Harding and David Stasavage. What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(01):229–245, 2014.

Pande, Rohini. 2011. “Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies” *Annual Review of Economics* 3: 215-237.

Case Study: Holding governments accountable in China

King G, Pan J, Roberts ME. 2013. How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 107(2):326–43

O'brien, K. J. (1996). Rightful resistance. *World Politics*, 49(1), 31-55.

Week 11: Corruption

In a well-functioning democracy, citizens hold politicians accountable via elections. What if criminality and corruption infringe on the very sanctity and performance of the electoral process? Can petty corruption be so damaging that it can distort government representation and accountability and perpetuate structural violence and poverty? Can greater female representation in government be possibly associated with lower levels of perceived corruption in that government? This week we examine how corruption, representation and accountability can be conceptually intertwined.

Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 19(3), 19-42.

Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J. (2007). Why do corrupt governments maintain public support?. *Comparative political studies*, 40(8), 949-970.

Odilla, F. (2023). Bots against corruption: Exploring the benefits and limitations of AI-based anti-corruption technology. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 80(4), 353-396.

Köbis, N., Starke, C., & Rahwan, I. (2022). The promise and perils of using artificial intelligence to fight corruption. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 4(5), 418-424.

Esarey, J., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. (2017). Women's representation, accountability and corruption in democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(3), 659-690

Case Study: Corruption in West Africa

Bensassi, S., & Jarreau, J. (2019). Price discrimination in bribe payments: Evidence from informal cross-border trade in West Africa. *World Development*, 122, 462-480.

Week 12: Social Unrest

There are many sources of social unrest in developing countries. This week we will discuss various triggers of social unrest including election processes and outcomes, religious conflict, development-induced displacement is also a source of social unrest in some developing countries. In other cases, social unrest spills over into full-blown insurgency, like in Nepal. Identity politics and nationalism is also fuelling unrest in some countries. What kind of institutional design and policy response ameliorates social unrest in developing countries?

Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins. Votes and Violence.

Abizadeh, A. (2002). Does liberal democracy presuppose a cultural nation? Four arguments. *American political science review*, 495-509.

Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring. *Comparative Politics*, 44(2), 127-149.

Case Study: Arab Spring and Hong Kong Protests

Stepan, A., & Linz, J. J. (2013). Democratization Theory and the "Arab Spring". *Journal of Democracy*, 24(2), 15-30.

Purbrick, M. (2019). A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests. *Asian Affairs*, 50(4), 465-487.